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This article argues that in its enormous Northern and Eastern stretches, the geographical
space of Russia was shaped by the fur trade. The essay follows the boom and depletion of
the fur trade in the longue durée of Russian history. The fur trade brought many Northern
tribes to the edge of extermination. Hunting and trapping was intrinsically violent, did not
entail the long-term cycles that were characteristic for agriculture, and needed no
participation from women. It also created the situation that some historians called the
hyper-activity of the state. The resource-bound economy made the population largely
superﬂuous. The essay also explores the historiography of the fur trade and the debates
that this historiography saw in the 1920s. Finally, it draws an analogy between two
resource-bound epochs, the pre-modern dependency of the Russian state on fur and its
modern dependency on oil. Very little part of the population took part in the fur business,
with the result that the state did not care about the population and the population did not
care about the state. A caste-like society emerges in these conditions. The security appa-
ratus becomes identical to the state. Due to a chance of history or geography, the same
areas that fed the fur trade of medieval Novgorod and Moscow, have provided the Soviet
Union and post-Soviet Russia with their means for existence.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.Historians write from the past to the present, but think
from the present to the past. 21st century Russia’s
successes and problems are plentiful; along with some
recent authors, I believe that the dependency on oil and gas
exports is an important source of many of them (e.g.
Friedman, 2006; Goldman, 2008; Ross, 2001). But unlike
these authors, I argue that a resource dependency far
predates post-Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union.-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,Hany1. Protego ergo obligo
Suppose that some valuable resource, say a raremetal, is
available at a single spot on earth. The labor theory of value
does not work on this land; the price of the metal is not
dependent upon the labor that is needed for mining this
metal. Since the whole population depends on the redis-
tribution of income that comes from a single spot, this state
has no reason to develop the governance mechanisms that
enable fair taxation, competition, and rule of law. The
security costs are serious because the state that owns this
spot would necessarily have many enemies. The trans-
portation costs are also substantial because this spot is
likely to be far from the traditional centers of population,
which developed according to an entirely different logic.angUniversity. ProducedanddistributedbyElsevier Limited.All rights reserved.
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little labor or knowledge. Instead, it develops a security
apparatus that protects the source of wealth and its
transportation routes, and a bureaucracy that redistributes
the wealth and demands respect.
Political philosophers have always known that those
who provide security tend to grasp property. “The protego
ergo obligo is the cogito ergo sum of the state”, wrote
Schmitt (1976, 56) (see also Bates, 2001). In our hypothet-
ical case it means that the group that trades the resource is
the same group that protects the state. Besides the classical
monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, as it was
deﬁned by Max Weber, such a state develops a monopoly
over the legitimate trade of its resource: a double
monopoly that could be best compared to a Mobius strip,
with one side managing the resource and another side
managing security and both sides smoothly merging with
each other (Etkind, 2009).
Let’s also imagine that the state controls a territory that is
larger than the spotwith thevaluable resource, and there are
many people living everywhere in the land. This situation
creates a rigid, caste-like structure. Two classes of citizens
emerge: the small elite of producers who extract, protect,
and trade the resource, and otherswhose existence depends
on the redistribution of the rent that this trade provides. The
state is fully dependent on the trading group; moreover,
these indispensable people are the state. But this state does
not necessarily ignore the people; it provides them with
security and other charities, indeed all that can be done after
the state satisﬁes its own needs. Human capital does not
determine the wealth of this nation. On the contrary, the
resource-bound state provides charity to the people.
In a neighboring land, which I call labor-bound, the
work of citizens creates the wealth of a nation. There is no
other source of wealth there than the competitive work of
its citizens. Value is created by labor; this old axiom still
works in this economy. The state taxes this labor and has no
other income. The health and education of the citizens are
not only in their best interest but also in the interests of the
state, because the better they work, the more taxes they
pay. But then, these happy citizens ﬁnd out that the growth
of their economy depends on a resource they do not have.
As they buymore andmore of this resource, its price grows,
production diminishes with depletion, and labor becomes
relatively cheaper than the resource. From now on, both
trading states become resource-bound. Nothing on earth
could change this common dependency unless the labor-
bound society focuses a part of its creative labor on
substituting the deﬁcient resource with something that it
has in abundance.
This process has not occurred with oil, but many
centuries ago, it did happen with another valuable
resource.2. A divine marvel
In a lively tale dated 1096, the Primary Chronicle
describes the ﬁrst resource curse in Russian history:
We have encountered a divine marvel . There are
mountains, which slope down to the arm of the sea, andtheir height reaches to the heavens .. Within these
mountains are heard great cries and the sound of voices
and [some people] are struggling to cut their way out of
this mountain . Their language is unintelligible. They
point at iron objects and make gestures as if to ask for
them. If given a knife or an axe, they supply furs in
return (Laurentian Text 1953, 184).
These people, the Iugra, were unclean, continues the
Chronicle, and with God’s help, Alexander of Macedonia
locked them inside this mountain in the northern Ural.
They will be released when the world comes to its end; till
then, they will be trading fur for iron. They are imagined as
a trading machine, speechless and subhuman. They do not
speak because their trade does not require language.
Nothing but fur justiﬁes the humans from Novgorod to be
there, among the Iugra.
Apart from Alexander, the tale is precise. In their quest
for fur, the Russians colonized a huge, exotic, and inhospi-
table space, called “the land of darkness” by early Arabic
travelers (Martin, 2004; Slezkine, 1994). Combining barter
with coercion, the Russians locked the peoples of the Arctic
North into a system of trade that led to the extermination of
animals and humans. Sons of Novgorod thought that their
operations would continue until the end of the world as
they knew it; indeed, their termination signaled the end of
Novgorod. It was an outright colonization that was named
so by major historians, Russian and Western alike. This
colonization led to a huge accumulation of wealth and
a proportional desolation of the natives, both processes
being of outstanding scale in colonial history.
The Russians came in small numbers and they did not
hunt the animals. They needed locals to do the highly
skilled jobs of hunting animals and dressing furs. The
natives had skills but were not much interested in fur,
which they used mainly for their own warmth. Only force
or commerce could turn these ﬁshermen or reindeer
herders into full-time hunters. The state established the fur
trade in several steps. First, the Cossacks conﬁscated the
furs that were already stored there. Second, the invaders
imposed a tribute that obliged each native man to deliver
a certain number of pelts annually. Third, the servitors
established customs in towns and on the roads that
collected the tithe in fur, usually a tenth of every trans-
action. Corruption was high and uncontrollable; bribes and
other illegal fees ate up a big part of the state income
(Bushkovitch, 1988, 117). Novgorod and later, Moscow had
to send more servitors to these vast lands, though the
number of Russian men was never high. As the Chronicle
remarked, the native tribes were locked into this trade. As
long as they provided fur, it was in the interest of the
servitors to maintain their conditions rather than to
christen and educate them. If baptized in the Orthodox
Church, natives would stop paying the tribute in fur and
start paying tax in rubles. This was undesirable; later, even
Christian communities had to pay tribute instead of tax if
they were perceived as non-Orthodox (Znamenski, 2007).
Since in many cases, the partners did not share a language
and were scared of one another, they developed a method
of “silent trade” that was surprisingly similar to the Iugra
trade of 1096:
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with [the Russians] except at the end of a spear. They
would hang a bundle of furs . upon a sharp polished
blade of a long Chookchi lance, and if a Russian trader
chose to take it off and suspend in its place a fair
equivalent in the shape of tobacco, well and good, if not,
there is no trade (Kennan, 1870, 286)
In Siberia as well as in North America, the fur business
was different from most “cross-cultural trades” because it
involved a meeting between the organized Europeans and
the natives, who had been isolated for centuries. Hunting
and trapping was intrinsically violent, did not entail the
long-term cycles that were characteristic for agriculture,
and needed no participation of women (Curtin, 1984, 219).
Tradewas also violent; evenwhen the Russians used barter,
it was barely distinguishable from robbing. They exchanged
furs for iron and other products of their superior civiliza-
tion, such as alcohol, tobacco, beads, knifes, and later, traps
and riﬂes. The Soviet scholars politely called this method
“the non-equivalent exchange” that was characteristic for
the “initial accumulation of the capital”.
In their quest for fur, Russian traders explored the vast
lands that stretch far to the north and east from the
metropolitan centers, Novgorod andMoscow, all theway to
the White Sea, cross the Ural Mountains, and open into
Siberia. Firearms were the key to this success, even though
they often worked merely as ﬁreworks. But violence was
not easy to convert into power. Judging by the later
evidence from the 18th and 19th centuries, the main
method of extracting fur from the natives was kidnapping,
which was known as “taking amanats”. Capturing the
native women and children and holding them in captivity,
Russians demonstrated them to their men in exchange for
furs. If the children survived to maturity, these amanats
would speak Russian; baptized, they could marry Russians
and contribute to the creolization of the locals (Liapunova,
1987, 59). In 1788, the Russians held as many as 500 chil-
dren of the Aleuts as amanats. Russian emperors, including
the enlightened Catherine the Creat, authorized this
method for “taming the natives” in ofﬁcial documents
(Slezkine, 1994; Grinev, n.d). Technical terms that were
foreign to both sides, usually of Arabic or Turkish origin,
were meant to mask the rude force. Concepts and practices
traveled across the empire, from the Caucasus to Alaska.
Iasak referred to the special regime of taxation, a tribute in
fur. First recorded in the late 16th century in the Southern
steppes, “taking amanats” was practiced by all sides during
the long Caucasian wars of the 18th and 19th centuries
(Khodarkovsky, 2002, 57). Broadly used as a method of
Russian colonization of Siberia and Alaska, this institu-
tionalized kidnapping was practically unknown in the
British, French, or Spanish colonization of the Americas
(Grinev, n.d).
Like almost all adventures of the Russian Empire the fur
trade was multinational. Along with the ethnic Russians,
the newcomers included their allies such as the Cossacks,
their exiles such as the Swedes and the Poles, and their
merchants such as the Tatars and the Jews (Glebov, 2009).
Hunting the hunters, the invaders met with formidable
resistance on the part of some tribes such as the Chookchi,the Kamchadals, the Aleuts, or the Koryaks (Bockstoce,
2009; Iadrintsev, 2003; Slezkine, 1994). When challenged,
the Russians responded with increasingly violent methods,
starting from the public ﬂogging and ending with the
indiscriminate killing. The Russian Orthodox bishop,
Innokentii Veniaminov, who later became theMetropolitan
of Moscow, reported that in 1766, Ivan Soloviev with his
seamen exterminated about 3000 Aleuts, more than a half
of the rebellious tribe (Veniaminov, 1840, 188–190).
Hundreds of the survivors were forced to resettle to
another archipelago to hunt sea otters. Reportedly, natives
hated Russians so much that they did not accept their
superior tools, such as traps, and continued to hunt with
a bow and arrow, therefore losing the competition to the
incomers (Pavlov, 1972).
Gradually, Russian servitors learned to bring the natives
“under the exalted hand of the great sovereign” by
demonstrating force rather than applying it. In a ceremo-
nial way, cannons and muskets were discharged while the
native chiefs took an oath to the sovereign and the
tribesmen were lined up as if they were an imperial guard.
(Lantzeff, 1972, 93). While the sovereign understood the fur
business as a kind of taxation and the natives understood it
as a kind of slavery, the local servitors had to improvise
a middle ground on which they could establish relatively
peaceful and proﬁtable trade. Giving “gifts” to the chiefs of
the tribes, befriending the shamans, upbringing or even
adopting the “amanats”, and arming one tribe against
another were ordinary methods of bringing people to
tribute. In many respects, the system of Russia’s rule in
Northern Eurasia was comparable with the later British
system in India. The rule was indirect, many tribes
preserved their autonomy, and the number of colonizers in
relation to the colonized territory was miniscule. However,
there were many differences. Due to fur, Russian coloni-
zationwas a very lucrative enterprise. Local tribes in Siberia
were exterminated to an extent that would have been
unbearable in India; actually, the population losses were
close to North American levels (Curtin, 1984, 208). Finally,
evenwith the depletion of the key resource, fur, the Russian
Empire kept its hold in Siberia, while the Brits preferred to
quit when they found maintaining the colony untenable.
In their subarctic colony, the Russians created a four-
layer political pyramid that consisted of the distant sover-
eign, his Russian servitors, the native hunters, and fur
animals. Violence spread down from the top to the bottom
and proﬁt grew from the bottom to the top. Formulating an
entirely different experience, the philosophers Giorgio
Agamben and Jacques Derrida wrote about proximity
between the sovereign and the beast, who are both
exempted from the law. In this they are like the criminals,
who populated Siberia alongwith animals. “Beast, criminal,
and sovereign have a troubling resemblance: they call on
each other and recall each other. outside the law”
(Derrida, 2009, 38). This resemblance of beasts and sover-
eigns created a thick layer of political mythology, with
Behemoths and Leviathans, thewolves of Rome and lions of
Venice, and Russian sables, eagles, and bears. Novgorod and
Moscow based their political economy on the direct
connection, economic as well as esthetic, between the fur-
clad tsars and the fur-carrying animals, with little or,
1 50,000 sables a year from 1630 to 1660 “at the very least”
(Bushkovitch 1980, 94, 69).
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this connection. The resource-bound economy makes the
population largely superﬂuous. An essential part of this
system is land. In its enormous Northern and Eastern
stretches, the geographical space of Russia was shaped by
the fur trade.
3. Boom and depletion
The fur pyramid was fragile. The closer we are to the
recorded history, the more we know about the rebellions of
the locals, the depletion of the animals, the corruption of
the servitors, and the discontent of the sovereign. The fur
trade brought many tribes to the edge of extermination; in
some cases the population loss was so deep and fast that it
is proper to speak of genocide. In 1882, the Siberian,
Iadrintsev was able to mention about a dozen ethnicities
that had been fully exterminated earlier but whose names
were still remembered. From the mid-18th to the mid-19th
centuries, the Kamchadals lost about 90% of its population,
the Vogules about 50%, etc. (Iadrintsev, 2003, 137–139).
Replacing the natives, Russian trappers had better
access to markets and courts. With their arrival, fur trade
normalized, but it coincided with the depopulation of
animals. Only sables provided enough proﬁt to support
a Russian trapper; squirrel, otter, and other animals
remained the business of the natives. In the early 17th
century, a good trapper could get as many as 200 sables
a year; closer to the end of the century, the numbers were
15–20 sables a year, which made the trade unproﬁtable
(Pavlov, 1972, 224). Then, Russian trappers dropped the
business but native hunters stayed in the trade. Objects of
desire and vanity, Siberian furs fed conspicuous consump-
tion on the pan-European scale for a longer period of time
than any other class of colonial goods. Silver from Spanish
colonies, spices from Dutch colonies, or tea from British
colonies could have generated even more wealth and
suffering; but in their symbolic value, furs were difﬁcult to
compete with. For just one of Henry IV’s outﬁts, London
skinners used 12,000 squirrel and 80 ermine skins, which
were extracted from the wild tribes thousands of miles to
the East (Veal, 1966, 20).
The fur trade became the backbone of the Hanseatic
League, which included Novgorod as its eastern member
and established a trading colony there. Upon purchase, the
Germans bounded the fur into bundles and packed them
into barrels, each containing 5000 to 10,000 pelts. In the
spring, the Germans shipped the fur barrels by Russian
lakes and rivers to the Neva and the Baltic. In exchange,
Russian merchants received weapons, silver, cloth, salt, and
sweet wine; beer, herring, and metal products also
appeared on the market. The fur trade provided hard
currency that Russian principalities needed for buying
weapons and mercenaries. In the late 14th century, about
95% of all furs that were imported to London were of
Hanseatic origin and most of them came from Novgorod.
The numbers were huge. During one year, 1391, London
imported 350,960 squirrel skins (Veal, 1966, 76). It was the
time when the Novgorod teams had already crossed the
Urals and collected tribute from theWestern Siberian tribes
of the Khanty, Mansi, and others.Though Russia was not the only source of furs, this
source became increasingly important with the deforesta-
tion of Europe. Until the end of the 15th century, squirrel
was available near Novgorod and beavers were trapped
near Moscow (Pavlov, 1972, 57, 67). However, London’s
import of fur started declining in the 15th century, which
some authors explain by the changing fashions in England;
most probably it was the result of the depletion of the
Russian forests. The fall of revenue from the fur trade was
a reason for the escalating conﬂict between Russian
centers. The fall of Novgorod in 1478 followed after the
decline of both the export volumes and the prices of gray
squirrel in Europe. Instead, Europeans discovered sable.
The routes to Siberia, the land of sable, went through the
Oriental Kazan, which was taken by the Muscovite troops
in 1522 in what was the turning point of Russia’s
colonization.
The burden of the resource-bound state only increased
with these events. In 1557, each male inhabitant of Iugra
had to give one sable a year to the sovereign of Moscow; in
1609, he was obliged to pay seven sables (Pavlov, 1972, 70).
In 1581, eight hundredmen led by Ermak defeated the khan
of Siberia. Carrying the Viking boats between Siberian
rivers and rowing upstream, they reached the tribes that
they could ﬁght with. Their ﬁrearms gave them the
advantage. Historians and poets have imagined these
events by analogy. Let me try.
We penetrated deeper and deeper into the heart of
darkness. It was very quiet there. At night sometimes the
roll of drumsbehind the curtain of treeswould runup the
river.We were wanderers on prehistoric earth, on an
earth that wore the aspect of an unknown planet. We
could have fancied ourselves the ﬁrst of men taking
possessions of anaccursed inheritance. (Conrad,1988, 37)
After two years of ﬁghting, Ermak was killed. 2400
sable, 800 black fox, and 2000 beaver pelts were sent to
Moscow (Fisher, 1943, 26). According to a historian of
Siberian fur, Vilkov (1999), during seventy years, 1621–
1690, more than seven million sables were procured in
Siberia. An American historian gives an estimate that is two
times lower.1 Martin (2004) estimated the average price of
sable at the end of the 16th century in Moscow as one ruble
per pelt. Using this low estimate, we obtain a sum of
50,000–100,000 rubles a year, high and long-term revenue
that the state was learning to appropriate. While some
Russian sources estimated the proportion of the fur trade in
the gross income of the Muscovite state as one-fourth, one
American historian gives the more believable ﬁgure of one-
tenth (Fisher, 1943, 122) and one Soviet scholar, one-ﬁfth
(Pavlov, 1972). However, the fur’s part in the state treasury
was much higher. Another major commodity was salt but it
was traded only on the internal market; the role of grain
export was minuscule till late in the 18th century. As
a matter of comparison, in 2005–2010, the share of the oil
and gas industry in Russia’s gross national income was
about 25% and in Russian export was 60–75%.
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create the state that some Russian historians, most prom-
inently Paul Miliukov, called “hypertrophic” or “hyperac-
tive” (Emmons, 1999). Providing the large share of the
state’s disposable income, the fur trade played its role in
ﬁnancing military campaigns, diplomatic activities, and
even religious treaties of the state. Upon the arrival of
a Russian envoy to the ruler’s court in the Southern steppes,
he would disburse pelts to the ruler and his nobles. In the
17th century, a good present would consist of forty sable
furs, one marten coat, and several other coats of lesser
value (Khodarkovsky, 2002, 66). Internal consumption of
the fur was also signiﬁcant. With the lack of silver, fur
played the role of currency. There were periods when
ofﬁcials of the Muscovite state, ofﬁcers in the army, and
doctors in the court received a half of their salaries in fur
(Pavlov, 1972, 102). The proﬁtability of colonies has been
a subject of much debate, but there is no doubt that Siberia
was very proﬁtable. A Siberian scholar compared the effect
of the fur trade for Russia’s economywith the ﬂood of silver
that came to Europe from the New World in the 16th
century (Pokshishevskii, 1951, 57).
After the termination of Hansa shipping from Novgorod,
the Siberian pelts were delivered through Moscow to
Leipzig, their distribution base in Europe, by terrestrial
routes. Though the Hansa had other goods to trade over the
Baltic, its collapse in the 16th century followed the
changing routes of the Russian fur trade. In the 1660–1670s,
the trade in furs sharply fell, which coincided in time with
the start of the inﬂation that lasted though the Time of
Troubles (Kliuchevsky, 1959). With the depletion of
animals, trapping and hunting were moving to the new
areas in the east. Looking for squirrel, beaver, sable, martin,
ermine, sea otter, and other wonders of the North, the
Russians moved farther and farther into the North-Eastern
corners of Eurasia, all the way to Kamchatka and then to
Alaska. In the late 17th century, the state monopolized the
export trade in all furs and the domestic trade in sables and
black foxes (Fisher, 1943, 65). These measures did not help;
the trade was in decline. Shchapov’s (1906) statistics of the
Muscovite “gifts” to foreign powers demonstrated that,
through the 17th century, the share of sable in these
collections was diminishing (2/330–332). As he formulated
it, the depletion of the “zoological wealth” caused the crisis
of the Russian state. Shchapov tells how hunters, dressers,
tradesmen, and drivers strove to ﬁnd new ways of subsis-
tence. The ecological disaster turned adventurists into
peasants, a long process that required generations who
barely survived the transition. It was equally bad for the
Russian state, whose infrastructure was dependent on fur.
When hare replaced sable in the Kremlin treasury, the
Moscow period of Russian history approached its end.
Fed by the fur trade, the state experimented with new
commodities and institutions. Hemp, iron and ﬁnally,
wheat replaced fur in Russian exports. Oprichnina, serfdom
and ﬁnally, imperial bureaucracy became substitutes for
the fur trade network. However, the state always remained,
or strived to remain, hyperactive. Its institutions ﬂourished
when they could develop a political economy that provided
the resource-bound income that was largely independent
of people’s labor. These were periods when, as Kliuchevsky(1959) put it, “the state grew swollen and the people sick”
(3/12). There were also periods when it was the state that
was sick. Establishing their trade with Archangel in 1555,
the British were interested in timber, wax, cordage, and
other forest products; fur comprised a minor part of the
trade (Bushkovitch, 1980, 68). King James estimated the
value of the region high enough to consider its colonization
in 1612–1613, during the Time of Troubles when the Polish
troops and stateless Cossacks took Moscow (Dunning,
1989; Kagarlitsky, 2003). Then, the Volga merchant,
Kuzma Minin, saved Russia from default and defeat by
ﬁnancing the war effort from the revenue of the salt trade,
a harbinger of the mining economy to come. When the
troubles were over, the hopes for commercewere projected
onto the South-West rather than the North-East. Expan-
sionism replaced the prudence of the Muscovite state in
respect to the steppes (Boeck, 2007). Even more impor-
tantly, the state experimented with new practices of
controlling and disciplining the population. Wheat, the
commodity of the future, required much more labor than
fur, and of a very different quality.
In the mid-18th century, the share of fur in Russia’s
budget was little, but it still dominated Russia’s exports to
China (Foust, 1969, 344; Pavlov, 1972, 119). Changes in both
production and consumption were involved in this decline.
Internationally, the Russian fur now competed with North
American, which was cheaper because of lower trans-
portation costs and custom fees. On a large scale of things,
fur lost to wool, which was at the peak of its success in
Europe and Americas. Converting a state monopoly into
a royal one, Catherine II moved the fur trade from the
Siberian Chancellery to the Personal Cabinet, the empress’
private treasury (Slezkine, 1994, 67). To a certain extent, the
superb collections of the Hermitagewere ﬁnanced from the
revenue that came from Siberian pelts. In this enlightened
era, the fur trade was discussed in terms of the economic
Mercantilism, which called for state monopolies in colonial
trade. In his comments on the Instruction by Catherine II,
Diderot wrote that in order to get rich by trade, a state
should maintain a monopoly if its source is far away and
there is no law in that land. In Russia, that meant Siberia
and its fur. Diderot (1992) was writing these comments
while returning from his visit to St. Petersburg and
receiving his salary from the Personal Cabinet of Catherine
(135, 159). Later, Catherine’s envoys introduced in some
parts of Siberia more rational regimes of fur extractions
(Glebov, 2009). Even in the end of 19th century, the fur
tribute composed more than ten percent of the Cabinet
income (Znamenski, 2007, 125).
Sable was gone and squirrel, out of fashion. But then,
James Cook’s expedition brought the news about the sea
otter. Cook’s sailors traded several pelts on Cook’s river for
a few glass beads each, and then sold them to the Chinese
in Canton for two thousands pounds. Published in 1784,
this story caused new British and French expeditions to
Alaska. Catherine the Great commissioned the young,
British-trained captain Grigory Mulovsky to head the
Russian expedition. George Forster, a participant of Cook’s
expedition and the author of its best-selling account,
agreed to take part in it. But with the start of still another
Russo-Swedish war, the expedition was canceled;
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found the sea otter in abundance and the Chinese
customers in waiting. In 1802, Johann von Krusenstern was
the ﬁrst Russian captain to circumnavigate the world,
though the reason for his expedition was still the same: fur
(Foust, 1969, 321). Founded in 1799, the Russian–American
Company traded fur for the next half century. The quick
depletion of sea otter killed this company, which did not
bring proﬁts anyway. Nothing but fur attracted the
government in St. Petersburg to Alaska and California. In
1867, the company was liquidated and the imperial
domains in North America were sold to the US.
4. Venus in furs
Beginning from the 17th century, European thinkers
formulated “the four stages theory” that stated that the
original mode of human economy was hunting and ﬁshing,
which gave way to pasturage, which was replaced by
agriculture and ﬁnally, by commerce. This narrative was
basedmainly on news from the recently colonized America,
where the four stages orderly replaced one another (Meek,
1976). But the Russian fur trade demonstrated a co-exis-
tence of distant stages such as hunting and commerce.
Those European thinkers whowere closer to Russia, such as
Pufendorf, did not share the four stage theory but believed
that various modes had in fact coexisted from Biblical
times. In his version of European history that was trans-
lated into Russian in 1718, Pufendorf (1764) talked about
the Russian Empire as “vastly extensive” though “barren
and uninhabited”. However, the Emperor’s revenue was
“very considerable” and “the Trade in Sables which is
entirely in his own Hands is a vast Addition thereto.” (v.2,
347–348) Pufendorf knew that, though in the very begin-
ning, all the world could have been like America, at its next
stages the world had become like Russia, mixed and
twisted.
Though the fruits of the Russian Arctic, fur pelts, had
been familiar to the Europeans, only in the 18th century
did the literate world learn about these lands. Then, the
mixed group of German academics, Orthodox mission-
aries, and political exiles found themselves in Siberia and
were able to write back to Europe. Exiled to Siberia in
1790, Nikolai Radishchev was the ﬁrst to explain the
takeover of Siberia as colonization and its motive as fur. In
his Concise History of the Acquisition of Siberia, Radishchev
(1941) wrote that the tsars gave rights to the Siberian
pioneers “over the lands that did not belong to Russia” and
that they were exempted from taxes in exchange for
supplying furs to Moscow (2/148). Writing in the 1830s,
the next Siberian historian, Slovtsov (1886), described in
detail how, in their search for beaver and sable, the ﬁrst
Siberian pioneers passed everything else including the
sources of metal that were discovered much later on lands
that had been colonized because of fur. When the
merchant family of Stroganovs, the oligarchs of West
Siberia who loyally ﬁnanced Russian tsars, obtained their
cote of arms in 18th century, they chose two sables as their
emblem. But Peter the Great rejected the ancient symbol
of Russian power, Monomakh’s Cap with its sable trim-
ming, for a crown made of gold and diamonds. A traveler,who visited Moscow in 1716, reported the local interpre-
tation of the Greek myth of the Argonauts: the Golden
Fleece was understood as the Siberian sable and the
Argonauts, as fur traders (Pogosian, 2001, 282). The peak
of this fur-clad myth-making was the famous novel by the
Austrian writer Leopold Sacher-Masoch, Venus in Furs
(1870), which featured a Slavic beauty who gave and
received pleasure from playing with Russian sables and
the knout.
In his Capital, Marx compared primitive accumulation
with original sin, which European empires committed in
their colonies. “In the tender annals of Political Economy,
the idyllic reigns from time immemorial” (Marx, 1990,
354): the origins of the imperial capitals in the bloody
commodities such as silver, fur, or ivory elude memory. On
a more scholarly note, it was Shchapov who in the mid-
19th century understood the crucial role of the fur trade in
terms of history, geography, ethnology, and ecology (he did
not know the latter word). A Siberian, Shchapov realized
the historical meaning of depletion of fur trade. He knew
the tragedies that developed at the frontlines of this
hunting colonization, where the Cossacks were extermi-
nating the hunting tribes in order to force them to exter-
minate the fur animals. One such event, which Shchapov
(1906) used extensively, was the colonization of the Aleut
Islands, where Russians forced the locals to hunt sea otter
until almost all of them, otters and humans, perished (2/
291). Shchapov’s anachronistic method, imagining the past
by analogy with the present, was the only available in
a situation in which the victims were illiterate and the
perpetrators, complicit.
Immensely inﬂuential among Russian radicals, Shcha-
pov’s ideas can be traced as far into the 20th century as Lev
Trotsky. During his Siberian exile in 1900–1902, the young
Trotskyworked for the Siberianmerchant, Yakov Chernykh,
who bartered fur with the local tribe of the Tungusy in
exchange for vodka and cloth. Illiterate, Chernykh had
revenue of millions, many thousands of people under his
hand, and operated on the huge space that spanned from
the Lena to the Volga. This Chernykh was the “indisputable
dictator” of the whole district, wrote Trotsky (1922), who
knew the meaning of the word “dictator”.
Trotsky made this remembrance public while debating
Russian history with the leading Marxist historian, Mikhail
Pokrovsky, in 1922. They both agreed that Russia featured
a “combined and uneven development”, a phrase that
Trotsky made famous. But Pokrovsky attacked Trotsky for
producing too static a picture of this unevenness. What
created these extreme differences? He cited the ﬁnal
chapters of Marx’s Capital, which narrated how, after the
Middle Ages, “the colonial system” played the “prepon-
derant role” in Europe and how this “strange God” of
colonialism “perched himself on the altar, cheek by jowl with
the old Gods of Europe” (Marx, 1990, 374). A student of
Kliuchevsky, Pokrovsky easily applied these colonial idioms
to the rewriting of Russian history (1920). Trotsky’s work for
a Siberian fur oligarch gave Pokrovsky just another example:
this Chernykh was just a new version of the Stroganovs, wrote
the historian. As a result, Pokrovsky revealed one of his
“heresies”, a belief that Russia developed “according to the
colonial type”. He blamed Trotsky inmisunderstanding this
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opment”. Pokrovsky asked Trotsky:
Is the concept of the colonial system applicable only to
the countries with hot climates and colored populations,
or could one imagine it also in the Siberian forest or in
the Northern Russian marshes? Does it require ostriches
and rhinoceroses, or are foxes, sables, and martins
enough for the colonial system? (Pokrovsky, 1922).
On the other side of the ocean, an American scholar,
Golder, gave a boost to the scholarly studies of Russian
colonial trade. Born inOdessa, Golder startedhis careerwith
teaching English in Alaska in 1899. Alaska was still a land
where the natives preferred Russian to English; Golder even
had to give his Fourth of July speech in Russian. After this
experience, he studied Russian history at Harvard and in
1921, tookpart in theAmerican Relief Administration (ARA),
trying to help the victims of famine on the Volga. He wrote
a magisterial book on the Russian expansion in the Paciﬁc
(Golder, 1914). Fed by his personal experience, his interest
was in de-mythologizing the fur trade and traders, who
were still perceived as like the Argonauts:
The Siberians of the 17th and 18th centuries were part of
the movement in which they were caught,. yet we are
expected to fall on our knees and bow to heroes. As
a matter of fact they were, at best, very ordinary men
and some of them were vicious and depraved. . In
every seaport town and in every frontier community
one will ﬁnd [similar] men (quoted from Lantzeff and
Pierce, 1973, 224).
Two Californian historians, Harold Fisher (who was
Golder’s associate in the ARA) and George V. Lantzeff,
continued Golder’s work (Emmons & Patenaude, 1992).
Writing in the 1950s, Lantzeff stated that “no search for any
single commodity has ever resulted in the acquisition of as
huge an area as the one acquired by Russia in this quest”.
One could add that no other quest for any single
commodity has been so well forgotten in the history of
human suffering. We know a thing or two about Cortez or
Kurtz; but looking at the splendid portraits of British kings,
nobody thinks about those little peoples in the Arctic who
exchanged these furs for “protection”.
5. Space through time
Catherine the Great justiﬁed monarchical rule in Russia
by its unusually large territory. But how was this territory
acquired in the ﬁrst place? She asserted that the Russian
Empire appropriated a big part of the world, “from the
Irtysh River to the Kuril Islands”, because of the Russians’
“proclivity for adventure” (Ekaterina, 1869, 256). Catherine
misrepresented a crude economic reality; this land was
taken in the quest for fur. However, the Russian Empire
retained its hold on the colonized land even after the fur
was depleted. With the one big exception of Alaska, the
areas of the fur trade were all held under Russian sover-
eignty even after this trade was discontinued and the lands
had no mercantile value. In the 19th century, these lands
were used mainly as penal colonies. Even Soviet military-
industrial sites did not change this large picture. A hugeexpanse of Northern Eurasia, of a size much larger than
Europe, remains underdeveloped and underpopulated.
(Hill & Gaddy, 2003).
In the 20th and 21st centuries, these lands of the fur trade
have played a new and precious role, which feels uncannily
similar to the old one. The same geographical areas that fed
the fur trade of medieval Novgorod and Moscow, have
provided the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia with their
means for existence. The oil and gas ﬁelds ofWestern Siberia
have been found in those very spaces that the greedy sons of
Novgorod colonized for fur trade with the Iugra, Hanty,
Mansi, and others. Like then, with the exhaustion of older
sites, the drillers are moving to the East, to the coasts and
islands of the Paciﬁc. Themain consumers of Russian gas and
oil are also located in many of those same places, from
Hamburg to London, which consumed Russian fur. The main
pipelines of Gazprom run along the terrestrial route from
Moscow through Poland to Leipzig and further to the West,
whichwasused for theexportof fur. The futureNorthStream,
the underwater pipeline that will provide Northern and
Western Europe with gas fromWestern Siberia, runs almost
precisely along the routes of the ancient Hanseatic trade.
Geographically, this resemblance is accidental. Aestheti-
cally, fur and oil could not be more different. Ecologically,
there is no correlation either: people drill oil and gas in
forests as well as in deserts, but only forests featured fur
animals. But politically, there is much in common between
an economy that relies on the export of fur and an economy
that relies on the exportof gas. Botheconomies are victims of
the resource curse, the one-sided development of a highly
proﬁtable extraction industry that leaves the rest of the
economy uncompetitive and undeveloped. In the long durée
of Russian history, taxing the trade in these commodities has
become the source of income for the state; organizing their
extraction, its preoccupation; securing the lines of trans-
portation that stretch across Eurasia, its responsibility. The
extraction takes highly specialized skills that have little to do
with the occupations of other parts of the population. Very
little part of the population takes part in business, with the
result that the state does not care about the population and
the population does not care about the state. A caste-like
society emerges in these conditions. The security apparatus
becomes identical to the state. This is the political economy
of what Arendt called “the mass man’s superﬂuousness”,
a situation that she believed to be foundational for totali-
tarian rule (1951, 311). More recently, institutional
economics has described two modes of relations between
resources, the state, and the subjects (North, Wallis, &
Weingast, 2009). In the “natural state”, a dominant group
limits access to valuable resources, creates rents out of these
resources, and rules over the population by applying
suppressionandbribery.Adifferent social order is “theopen-
access state”, which controls internal violence by providing
equal opportunities to its citizens. In such a society, there is
no legal ormetaphysical differencebetween theelite and the
populus. Historically, the lack of natural resources leads to
the development of human capital and the creation of the
open-access system, while the abundance of such resources
keepsastate in its resource-boundcondition.However, there
are many exceptions from this rule of thumb. Norway and
Canada remain balanced economies despite the abundance
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disease”. Politically, resource dependence can be dealt with.
Historically, it can come and go.
There have been two resource-bound periods of Russian
history, the era of fur and the era of gas. Historically
discontinuous, these two periods feature uncanny similar-
ities – structural and geographic, essential and accidental.
Processing these commodities is unusually messy. The
state’s dependency on trade in them makes the population
superﬂuous. Extracting, storing, and delivering these
resources makes security more important than liberty.
Reliance on these resources destroys the environment,
natural and cultural. And oil is also counted in barrels.
We knowhow theﬁrst period ended. The depletion of the
key resource, fur, drove the state into a major crisis. It forced
a radical change in Muscovite mores, which included the
election of a newdynasty by vote, the importof the European
Enlightenment, and the institution of the formal Empire. The
state redirected its colonization activities from the fur-rich
Eastern forests to the grain-rich Southern steppes, and later
to the silk-rich Transcaucasia and the cotton-rich Central
Asia. However, nothing in this later history would be
comparable in proﬁtability, duration, and scale of expansion,
with the fur trade. Consumers also changed, though it is
amusing to see how long it took theWest to kick its fur habit.References
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